Key developments first.
Reading
USACE Power Reliability Enhancement Program moved under Huntsville Center; ran 12 Black Start Exercises this year (7 Army, 4 Air Force, 1 Navy), each cutting commercial power for at least 8 hours. Surfaced 2026-10-26 PM.
Contract SP060418F8009 from Defense Logistics Agency to HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC for $25,802,400. Description: IGF::OT::IGF ENERGY SAVINGS PERFORMANCE CONTRACT. Period starts 2018-08-03.
FORTRESS still in cost-assessment stage; funding to be a multiyear ramp-up rather than one lump sum.
Senior defense official: FORTRESS energy pillar is the first priority; installation assessments of ~500 CONUS bases underway to determine cost; could take decades.
What GAO Found The Department of Energy (DOE) created initial future land use plans in coordination with local communities as early as 1992 at six cleanup sites GAO selected for review. These plans inform but do not bind assumptions about future land use that DOE and regulators make when selecting a cleanup remedy at a site. The remedy selected during the cleanup process has lasting consequences for how a parcel of land can be used, even after DOE transfers or leases it to another federal agency, a state or local government, or a private party. For example, any future use that would increase exposure to residual contamination above the contemplated level could undermine the protectiveness of the remedy. Accordingly, assumptions about future land use provide a framework for the range of uses that are safely available for a given parcel after cleanup. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) General Process for Identifying Future Land Use and Subsequent Cleanup and Transfer Decisions at Selected Cleanup Sites At the Oak Ridge, Paducah, Portsmouth, and Savannah River sites, DOE and regulators established cleanup levels that aligned with DOE’s initial future land use plans for these sites. DOE agreed to clean up most of the contaminated areas at these sites to support industrial use. For nearly a third of the Hanford site and most of the contaminated areas of the Idaho site, DOE and regulators set more stringent cleanup standards than needed to meet DOE’s anticipated conservation, preservation, or industrial uses for the land. However, while they agreed to cleanup standards based on residential use, future residential use is unlikely. They said it would be difficult to go back and calculate the cost difference between cleaning up to support residential and the other uses, but others noted cleaning up to support residential use is typically more costly. DOE has transferred or leased a small amount of land to the community or private entities for industrial use at five of the sites. DOE recently announced new initiatives for energy development, integrated hubs for nuclear fuel cycle activities, or co-located data centers to support artificial intelligence infrastructure. Some community stakeholders have expressed interest in more land transfers, and they generally expressed support for industrial reuse. DOE officials and stakeholders cited some potential benefits, such as economic growth, high-quality jobs, or local tax revenue. They also cited potential drawbacks, such as taking focus and resources away from cleanup, pollution and site recontamination risks, and future DOE liabilities. Why GAO Did This Study DOE is responsible for cleaning up sites contaminated from decades of nuclear weapons production and research. DOE estimates cleaning up 15 remaining sites will cost between $641 billion and $840 billion and be completed in 2100. When making cleanup decisions, DOE and its regulators assess risk to people who may use the land in the future—such as for industrial or residential purposes—to inform its approach and set cleanup standards. Senate Report 118-188 includes a provision for GAO to report on DOE’s future land use planning at cleanup sites. This report describes (1) DOE’s role in future land use determinations, (2) how cleanup decisions align with initial land use plans, and (3) what land DOE has transferred or leased to local communities. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and agency documents at six sites selected to represent a range of regulatory frameworks, stages of cleanup, and future land uses. GAO visited two of the sites and interviewed DOE officials, regulators, tribal officials, and community stakeholders.
What GAO Found The Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear waste cleanup is proceeding largely under three laws that set cleanup and waste management requirements. Each law has different requirements, applications, and regulators. Selected Cleanup and Waste Management Laws and Regulators for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Nuclear Waste Cleanup GAO and experts GAO convened with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine identified several legal and regulatory factors that affect the cost and schedule of DOE’s nuclear waste cleanup. Certain state regulatory actions may exceed state authority. According to experts who participated in GAO’s National Academies meetings, some states are taking legal and regulatory actions that address the radiological aspects of nuclear waste at DOE’s cleanup sites, which are generally regulated by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Such actions may exceed a state’s authority to regulate hazardous waste under authorizations from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended (RCRA). These state actions have led to disagreements between DOE and states on requirements for the radiological portion of DOE’s waste, longer cleanup schedules, and billions in higher costs for the federal government, according to experts. Courts have recognized that DOE’s authority to manage and regulate its nuclear waste under the Atomic Energy Act preempts certain state regulatory actions that impact DOE’s management of nuclear waste during its cleanup efforts. However, based on GAO’s analysis, statutes and case law are unclear on what kinds of state actions that affect DOE’s management and cleanup of radioactive waste are appropriate under the law, in part because of the prevalence of mixed waste at DOE cleanup sites. According to experts, because states are often taking such actions under state programs that are authorized by EPA to implement a federal law (RCRA), EPA could play a more active role in addressing instances where states may be improperly seeking to regulate radioactive materials covered by the Atomic Energy Act. EPA officials told us they currently do not have authority to challenge such state actions, as long as those actions are at least as stringent as federal requirements. If Congress clarifies the scope of the Atomic Energy Act’s preemption—and creates a mechanism that allows for DOE to appeal to EPA to evaluate state actions that may infringe on federal authority over nuclear waste covered by the Atomic Energy Act—costly and resource-intensive legal disputes could be reduced and decision-making could be accelerated. Assumptions about anticipated future land and groundwater use are sometimes unrealistic and can unnecessarily increase costs and schedules. Under the applicable laws and regulations, DOE’s cleanup of its sites is based, in part, on the anticipated future uses of land and groundwater for an area. According to experts at GAO’s meetings, DOE is cleaning up some areas based on unrealistic assumptions about those future uses. For example, DOE has agreed with state regulators and EPA to clean up large portions of some sites to allow for future residential use, even though there are no plans for such use. DOE did not evaluate the costs associated with cleaning up to less stringent standards associated with different land uses in those cases. By comparison, realistic decisions about future land use have been critical to the successful cleanup of other DOE sites, such as at Rocky Flats in Colorado. After Congress designated that site as a national wildlife refuge in 2001, cleanup costs decreased from an estimated $23 billion for residential use to about $10 billion. Historical Disposal (left) and Its Cleanup (right) at Idaho National Laboratory According to experts, a better framework for making realistic assumptions about future land use at DOE’s cleanup sites is needed. For example, DOE could assess benefits and costs associated with cleanup based on a range of potential future land uses. Clarification from Congress, and additional guidance from EPA and DOE, on incorporating future land use assumptions into the cleanup process would better position DOE to select appropriate cleanup approaches that are realistic, cost-effective, and aligned with congressional expectations. The legal framework often requires DOE to clean up contaminated groundwater to meet drinking water standards, but, according to experts, the assumption that groundwater beneath contaminated sites will be used for drinking water in the future is sometimes unrealistic. Further, according to experts, standards for certain contaminants that can apply to groundwater are based on outdated information from the 1960s and may affect the feasibility of cleanup. By accounting for current scientific information, DOE may be able to achieve cleanup that is both protective and avoids unnecessary expenditures. Other aspects of the legal and regulatory framework for DOE’s nuclear cleanup are sources of conflict and affect costs and schedule. For example, DOE entered into various cleanup agreements with EPA and states in the 1990s before the extent of contamination was fully known. These agreements include hundreds of milestones that DOE has sometimes struggled to meet. In a poll, all experts at GAO’s meetings recommended that DOE and EPA create an interagency task force of experts to review high-priority cleanup decisions and areas of legal and regulatory disagreement for opportunities to make DOE’s cleanup approach more risk-informed and cost-effective. Having an independent task force provide recommendations to DOE and EPA—such as when disagreements occur over revising cleanup agreements—may help to allow for cleanup approaches that more efficiently complete DOE’s cleanup mission. Why GAO Did This Study DOE is cleaning up nuclear sites across the country, the majority of which were created during World War II and the Cold War to research and produce nuclear weapons. DOE has estimated it could take until 2100 and cost $641 billion to $840 billion dollars to complete its nuclear waste cleanup mission. Much of the waste at DOE sites is mixed waste, meaning that it includes both radiological and hazardous constituents. Radioactive waste emits radiation, sometimes for thousands of years. Hazardous waste may be toxic, corrosive, ignitable, or reactive. Under a complex legal and regulatory framework, DOE and regulators (EPA and states) make decisions that affect the cost and schedule of DOE’s nuclear cleanup efforts. For years, organizations have reported on the ways in which this framework has affected DOE’s ability to complete its nuclear waste cleanup mission, such as through inconsistent decision-making processes for similar risks across sites. GAO was asked to review the impact of the legal and regulatory framework on DOE’s nuclear waste cleanup mission. This report examines (1) how state legal and regulatory actions affect DOE’s ability to manage the radiological portions of nuclear waste at its cleanup sites, (2) how DOE’s cleanup efforts are affected by assumptions about future land and groundwater use under the applicable legal framework, and (3) other aspects of the legal and regulatory framework that can contribute to higher cleanup costs and longer schedules. GAO convened a series of expert meetings with the National Academies; conducted legal research, a literature review, and four case studies across six DOE cleanup sites; and interviewed DOE, EPA, and state officials.
What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversees a $25 billion annual budget and approximately 70,000 management and operating contractor personnel to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear nonproliferation efforts. NNSA took steps to build its federal workforce to meet mission needs in 2024, with its workforce peaking at 1,991 early in fiscal year 2025. However, since then through the second quarter of fiscal year 2026, NNSA has reduced its federal workforce by 236 employees—or 11.9 percent. These reductions have impacted NNSA’s mission critical workforce, including occupations like nuclear engineers and contract specialists. Number of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Federal Employees and Annual Appropriations, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023–FY 2026 Quarter (Q) 2 Note: The Federal Salaries and Expenses appropriation account funds the salaries, benefits, and other related expenses for most of NNSA’s federal workforce. The reduction of NNSA’s workforce occurred because of two primary reasons: (1) very limited hiring and (2) employee separations—primarily employees choosing to retire or resign. Hiring was limited during the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2026. Why GAO Did This Study NNSA—a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)—has a current workload that is at its highest level since the Cold War as the agency oversees a $200 billion, 2-decades-long effort to modernize nuclear weapons and related infrastructure. In May 2024 (GAO-24-106167), GAO found NNSA continued to face challenges recruiting and retaining federal staff to meet the agency's mission needs, even though a statutory cap limiting the number of its federal employees was eliminated in fiscal year 2023. NNSA committed to developing a workforce planning process intended to inform future budget requests in response to its increased workload, the elimination of the cap, and consistent with GAO’s May 2024 report. The agency began building its workforce to meet mission needs in 2024. However, in response to presidential directives in early 2025, NNSA reduced the size of its federal workforce. GAO was asked to examine NNSA’s retirements, resignations, terminations, and other voluntary or involuntary workforce reductions since January 2025. This report describes changes to NNSA’s federal workforce from the beginning of fiscal year 2023 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2026. GAO analyzed relevant NNSA data for workforce and personnel actions, including hires and separations, by program, office, and location. GAO also reviewed NNSA budget information and interviewed NNSA officials. For more information, contact John Bumgarner at BumgarnerJ@gao.gov.
What GAO Found Artificial intelligence (AI) is being used in a variety of scenarios, or use cases, in the Department of Defense (DOD). In guidance, DOD established AI Ethical Principles and the concept of Responsible AI to ensure the safety and trustworthiness of AI systems. DOD further defined six tenets to guide Responsible AI implementation. Most of the 10 DOD components GAO surveyed reported taking at least initial steps to establish oversight and implement Responsible AI tenets in the selected surveyed use cases. The Office of the Chief Digital and AI Officer (CDAO), through its Responsible AI Division, established the Responsible AI Working Council as the working-level collaborative group for Responsible AI. However, CDAO officials said the council did not meet from late 2024 until August 2025. Officials from four DOD components told GAO they faced Responsible AI implementation challenges during this time that would have benefited from collaboration. Six of 10 surveyed components reported that sharing Responsible AI resources and best practices would benefit their implementation efforts. Although officials said the council resumed meetings in August 2025, it is at risk of lapsing again as it does not have a charter that defines roles and responsibilities and specifies meeting frequency. Another lapse could increase the risk of DOD facing Responsible AI implementation issues, such as inconsistent interpretation of related guidance, that it would not have the collaborative capacity to swiftly and effectively resolve. CDAO officials identified additional actions that could help DOD implement Responsible AI. However, CDAO has experienced staffing shortages that have hindered its ability to take these actions. Specifically, officials said that as of February 2026, only three of the 10 authorized positions for the Responsible AI Division were filled. Responsible AI enables DOD to more quickly adopt AI. By addressing current workforce needs for the Responsible AI Division, CDAO could make more progress toward its goal of accelerating AI across DOD. GAO previously made recommendations on issues related to DOD’s AI collaboration and workforce. DOD has not fully addressed those recommendations. Congressional action to ensure that DOD takes steps to fully address those prior recommendations would help position the department to meet its AI goals. U.S. Marine Corps Service Members Conduct Training Using an Artificial Intelligence-Enabled System Why GAO Did This Study AI has changed the national security landscape. U.S. adversaries and competitors are investing heavily in AI and AI-enabled capabilities in ways that threaten global security. As DOD speeds AI development, it is critical for the department to do so responsibly so that warfighters can quickly and confidently adopt it. Senate Report 118-188 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 includes a provision for GAO to review the implementation and oversight of DOD’s Responsible AI guidance, among other things. This report discusses DOD’s approach to the responsible use of AI, including related guidance, implementation, and oversight. GAO collected and reviewed DOD documentation related to Responsible AI. GAO also conducted a survey of 10 DOD components to understand how they have implemented Responsible AI tenets in 10 selected use cases. GAO also interviewed cognizant DOD officials.
USD(A&S) Michael Duffey memo (Oct 6) directs eight senior officials to begin standing up the FORTRESS America Program Office, focused on selective implementation across the five pillars. Surfaced as catch-up 2026-10-26.
Small rooftop solar arrays via IGSA with Center Line ($347K Bldg 229; Bldgs 203/231 next); no islanding. Background only.
Rewrite of Fort Buchanan $45M microgrid. Duplicate.
USACE Louisville RFI weighing OTA progressive design-build for ERCIP microgrids: Fort Sill 18 MW black-start natural gas plant + microgrid (14+ day critical loads) and Camp Parks PRFTA microgrid expansion to full peak critical load. Market research only. Surfaced as catch-up 2026-10-26 PM.
Defense communities group summarizes FORTRESS and new base competition.
Explainer recycling 90-day report and O'Malley memo. Duplicate.
Explainer recycling O'Malley interim director and 90-day report. Duplicate.
Rewrite of DefenseScoop: Matt O'Malley interim director of FORTRESS program office (Oct 6 Duffey memo). Duplicate of known memo.
Posted the Sept. 30 FORTRESS memo text.
Hegseth memo establishes FORTRESS America with five pillars incl. energy independence and installation hardening; A&S to stand up program office within 30 days.
Rock Island award record. Duplicate.
Ohio ANG 178th Wing (Springfield) awarded Big Shine Worldwide ~$8.21M (W50S8Q26CA002, Sept 29) for basewide microgrid system construction. Surfaced as catch-up 2026-10-27 AM.
USACE NY opened bids Sept 28 for JBMDL (McGuire AFB) microgrid: 2x500 kW gas gens, 3x500 kW/500 kWh batteries, ~400 kW solar, black-start of 2.5 MW critical loads within 60 s; gov estimate $16.43M, low bid PKF-Mark III $11.35M; no award yet, funds not yet appropriated. Surfaced as catch-up 2026-10-27 AM.
Award notice W912QR26CA041 for Rock Island microgrid. Duplicate of above.